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lN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~H.:MARJE BASINGER 
. ' . ·· .Piailnitiff and A.ppellaint, 
~ Vs. 
;~T,~ARD FURNITURE COM-
,,~ANY, a corporation; ZION'S 
.COOPERATIVE MERCANTILE 
JNSTITUTION, 
J ,.. Defendants 0/YI.d Respo'l'lldents, FILl 
ZION'S. s .A vI N ·G s BANK AND 
.,aUS:T· C'OMP ANY, and LOIS 
, GRElf:WWOOD doing business as 
·LOIS '·G~EENWOOD, 
. · .. · . Defendatrbts. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
FEB 3 l~. 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court, 
'.in and.for Salt Lake Gounty, State of Utah, 
· .Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., Judge 
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN & 
CHRISTENSEN 
.Attorneys for Standard Furniture 
0 ompanvy, 
HOMER HOLMGREN 
ROBERT A. SPOONER 
A.tto·rney's for Zion's Co-'otperative 
M eroantile Institution. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RUTH ~IARIE BASINGER 
Plaintiff and A ppelldJnt, 
vs. 
STANDARD FURNITURE CO~f­
PANY, a corporation; ZION'S 
COOPERATIVE MERCANTILE 
INSTITUTION, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
ZION'S SAVINGS BANK AND 
TRUST COMPANY, and LOIS 
GREENWOOD doing business as 
LOIS GREENWOOD, 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
This action was brought by plaintiff against all of 
the above named defendants. The action is one for 
damages for personal injuries received by plaintiff when 
she stumbled and fell while walking west on the sidewalk 
on the south side of South Temple Street, about 22 East, 
at a point where a driveway crosses the sidewalk and 
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runs into the rear of the Zions Savings Bank & Trust 
Company's building. The West edge of this driveway was 
lower than the sidewalk to the west at the point where 
plaintiff fell. 
As the basis for the charge of negligence on the part 
of the defendants, plaintiff alleges (see Amended Com-
plaint, paragraph II and IV, R.p. 18) first that defen-
dants constructed and maintained said driveway, second 
used it as a means of egress and ingress to the rear en-
trances of their business establishments; and third that 
as a result of the use thereof by heavy trucks ·and other 
vehicles hauling various articles to and for defendants 
the driveway was caused to sink below the level of the 
sidewalk to. the west of the driveway, and, as a result 
of such sinking, there was a perpendicular ledge about 3 
inches high along the west edge of the driveway, which 
created a dangerous nuisance to pedestrians using the 
sidewalk. That plaintiff caught her foot on said raise 
and fell, thereby sustaining injuries. 
At the trial, and after plaintiff had rested, plaintiff's 
counsel moved the court to dismiss the action with pre-
judice as to defendant Lois Greenwood. This motion 
was granted ( R. p. 221). The other defendants made sepa-
rate motions for nonsuit. The grounds stated in these mo-
tions were substantially as follows: 
1. The evidence failed to show that the defendant 
had committed any unlawful act or was guilty of any 
negligence of any kind. 
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2. There is no evidence to show that the driving of 
the trucks of the defendant, or anyone else, or the use 
made of the driveway by defendant, caused the defect 
in the sidewalk; there is no evidence to show whether 
the sidewalk went up west of the driveway or the drive-
way went down, the evidence showing only a difference 
in elevation. 
3. There is no evidence that the defect in the side-
walk did not exist before the defendant began using the 
driveway. 
4. There is no evidence of ownership of the drive-
way by the defendant or any right to the use thereof 
by defendant. 
As to the defendant Zion's Savings Bank the further 
ground was stated that there was no evidence of any use 
of the driveway by or for the said bank. 
Each motion was granted and the action dismissed 
as to all defendants. Plaintiff's notice of appeal filed 
herein shows that the appeal is taken from the judgment 
of dismissal as to all defendants, except Lois Greenwood. 
In her brief, however, plaintiff states (p. 3) that she is 
not appealing from the judgment of dismissal in favor 
of the Zion's Savings Bank, and confines her appeal to 
the dismissal as to defendants Standard Furniture Com-
any and Z. C. M. I. We take it, therefore, that the appeal 
is abandoned by plaintiff as to the defendant Zion's 
Savings Bank, and so this brief is confined to, and is 
filed by, Standard Furniture Company and Z. C. M. I. 
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only. Whenever the word ''defendants'' is used here-
after in this brief it will be deemed to refer only to the 
Standard Furniture Company and the Z. C. M. I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
That the sidewalk to the west as it adjoined the 
driveway at the point where pJaintiff fell was about 
1~ inches higher than the driveway is not in dispute. 
We further admit that trucks 'of various sizes up to 
1~ ton capacity have used the driveway for many years 
to haul merchandise to and from the rear entrances 
of the -defendants' places of business. What we do dis-
pute is that there is any evidence showing that the use 
of the driveway by the defendants, or either of them, 
caused this difference in elevation. We confidently assert 
that the evidence not only fails to show that the use of 
the driveway by trucks and vehicles caused the driveway 
to sink, but affirmatively shows that the difference 
in elevation between the driveway and the sidewalk to 
the west was created by· constructing the sidewalk higher 
than the driveway. So that there will he no chance for 
a mistaken conclusion we quote the testimony of plain-
tiff's·own witness, James M. Armstrong, the only witness 
who testified on this point: 
Mr. Armstrong started to work for the Stan-
dard Furniture Company as a steady employee 
October 1, 1928 (R. 215). He had worked for the 
company before that as a boy (R. 210). The fol-
lowing is his testimony beginning on page 210 
of the Record and continuing to page 212. 
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Q. Do you recall that some years back the side-
walk from the driveway west was rebuilt~ 
A. Yes, I recall that. 
Q. And the sidewalk from the driveway, includ-
ing the driYeway and east wasn't rebuilt at 
that time~ 
A. There has nothing been done to that drive-
way east, to my knowledge, since I have been 
there, but I do recall this west part. 
Q. Now do you recall and did you observe that 
when the sidewalk was built west from the 
driveway that it was built a little higher 
than the driveway~ 
A. Yes, I recall that very markedly. There 
isn't a great deal of a raise there but there 
is a raise and it has always been there. 
Q. Since the sidewalk was built on the west side 
of the driveway~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you observed that from going in and 
out there all these years~ 
A. Yes, sir. It is approximately an inch up and 
has been as long as I can remember. 
Q. And did you observe on the east side of the 
driveway, where the sidewalk wasn't changed 
it is the same elevation~ 
A. Yes, sir. I would say it is the same elevation. 
There is nothing there that has been changed 
at all. It appears comparatively flat. When 
you figure the years it has been in service 
there, from weather cracks and so on. But 
this part over here east of where . . . . 
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Q. East of the driveway 1 
A. East of the driveway is shattered really 
worse than the driveway itself. 
Q. How many years has it been shattered that 
way, that you can recall. 
A. I don't remember when it wasn't shattered. 
Q. And that would be how many years? 
A. Twenty years ago. 
On re-direct examination Mr. Armstrong testified 
as follows: 
Q. Mr. Armstrong, how old were you-or I will 
ask you first if this cement work to the east 
(west) of the driveway was done before 
you became a steady employee of Standard 
Furniture? 
A. It was done after I was steadily employed 
there. 
Q. Within the last twenty years, is that right? 
A. I would say so. I will give you the exact 
date when I started there-October 1st of 
1928. That makes twenty years, doesn't it? 
Q. In October. Now Mr. Armstrong, I show you 
what has been marked plaintiff's Exhibit 
B, and I will ask you if you know when the 
crack in the foreground of that picture which 
runs east and west, appeared in that drive-
way? 
A. This large crack' 
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Q. Yes. 
A. 'Ve have been familiar with that particular 
crack and this one over here as long as I 
can remember. 
Q. And you don't know when that appeared 
there¥ 
A. It has been there as long as I can remember. 
The witness was then shown Exhibit A, marked 
on the reverse side, and was asked if the driveway and 
the sidewalk to the west were not on a level at the corner 
of the Lois Greenwood store. The witness then indicated 
that from the point marked "Y" on the exhibit north-
ward the sidewalk and the driveway were not on the same 
level. He then testified that two or three years ago 
tar surfacing was placed on the driveway. Counsel then 
tried to get the witness to say that Exhibit "B" shows 
a dip in the driveway at the point "X," but the witness 
said he could not say as he could not recall what the 
driveway looked like before it was resurfaced. The fore-
going is contained in the transcript pages 216-218. This 
resurfacing was not done 'by the Standard Furniture 
Company, but presumably by the city (R. p. 219). 
The witness testified that the work of rebuilding 
the sidewalk to the west of the driveway was done in 
1930 or 1931. The whole thing was torn up for quite 
some time and he presumed it was new all the way 
through ( R. p. 220). 
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ARGUMENT 
THE DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO A NONSUIT 
AND DISMISSAL AS THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRO-
DUCE ANY EVIDENCE WHAT·SOEVER TO SUSTAIN HER 
CHARGE OF NEGLIGENCE ALLEGED IN HER AMENDED 
COMPLAINT. 
I. 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE THAT DEFENDANTS 
CONSTRUCTED OR MAINTAINED SAID DRIVEWAY. 
There is absolutely no evidence to show that these 
defendants, or any one else, constructed and maintained 
this driveway. The only maintenance shown in the 
record was the re-surfacing of the entrance to the drive-
way from the st:reet, done, presumably, by the city. 
(R. p. 219). Furthermore, there is no evidence at all as 
to the ownership of the alleyway. The plat, introduced 
in evidence as Exhibit '' E,'' shows the property of the 
Zions Savings Bank, 45 feet by 165 feet, an'd shows an 
arrow extending into this alleyway or right of way. But 
Willard R. Smith, the vice president of the bank, testify-
ing on behalf of the plaintiff, stated very definitely that 
the bank did not own this alleyway-all it owned was a 
piece 45 feet wide on Main Street and 165 feet long on 
South Temple Street (R. p. 196). The only connection 
which the evidence shows these defendants have with this 
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alleyway is that defendant ~tandard ~,urniture Company 
leases premises, and the defendant Z. C. M. I. owns 
pren1ises, which abut at some point on this alleyway and 
that they use, and have used, this alleyway to deliver 
goods to and take away goods from their places of busi-
ness. "\Ve. have either quoted or referred to all the 
evidence which in any manner relates to the construc-
tion and maintenance and ownership of this alleyway 
and respectfully submit that there is no evidence what-
ever to sustain the plaintiff's allegation that these de-
fendants constructed and maintained the same. 
II. 
USE OF THE ALLEYWAY BY THESE DEFENDAN'l'S 
IS ADMITTED. 
That these defendants have used this alleyway, and 
were using it at the time of plaintiff's accident, as a 
means of ingress and egress to and from their respective 
places of business is shown by the evidence. But there 
is an absolute vacuum in the evidence as to the legal 
basis upon which such use is founded, whether under 
legal right or adverse use. We mention this phase sim-
ply to make it clear that there is, under the evidence, no 
duty on the part of either defendant to keep the alleyway 
and driveway in repair because of or as an incident 
to ownership thereof, or any claim of ownership. 
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III. 
PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT OF ACTION, IF SHE HAS ONE, 
MUST REST ENTIRELY ON THE ALLEGATION THAT THE 
USE MADE BY THESE DEFENDANTS OF SAID DRIVE-
WAY AND ALLEYWAY IN RUNNING TRUCKS AND OTHER 
VEHICLES OVER THE SAME CAUSED THE DRIVE-
WAY TO SINK BELOW THE LEVEL OF THE SIDEWALK 
TO THE WEST, LEAVING A PERPENDICULAR LEDGE 
ABOUT 3 INCHES HIGH ALONG THE WEST EDGE OF 
THE DRIVEWAY. 
We remind the .court again that we have quoted and 
referred to all the evidence in the record that could have 
any bearing upon this point. We shall proceed to analyze 
it. 
There is absolutely no evidence that at some time in 
the past said driveway was on a level with the sidewalk 
to the west. There is definite evidence that it is now, 
and for 20 years has been on a level with the sidewalk 
to the east. See statement of Mr. Armstrong R. 212, 
quoted in our Statement of Facts and see photo Exhibit 
1. Unless it is shown that at some time prior to plaintiff's 
accident the driveway was on a level with the sidewalk 
to the west how can it be said that at some time prior 
to plaintiff's accident it sunk below the sidewalk leveU 
It might be assumed, of course, that the driveway, as 
originally constructed, was level with the west sidewalk 
as then constructed, the same as it is on the east side. 
If the evidence were that there had been no change in 
the sidewalk to the west and that it is still the original 
sidewalk and that it originally was on a level with the 
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drive,Yay there might be room for an inference that the 
driveway had settled or sunk, providing, of course, there 
was no room for an inference that the sidewalk had 
raised by reason of the action of the elements. 
There would also be the difficulty of finding any-
thing in the evidence to show that the trucks or vehicles 
used by o,r for either or both of these defendants caused 
this sinking. There is not a shred of evidence to show 
that. All that appears is this: There is a difference in 
elevation between the west edge of the driveway and the 
adjacent sidewalk of about llh inches at the point where 
plaintiff claims she fell, the lowest point along the entire 
west edge. So we must conclude or permit the jury to infer 
that it was the trucks of the defendants that caused 
that difference in elevation. There is no evidence that 
this driveway was not used by others than these two de-
fendants. There is no evidence to show that the settle-
ment might not have occured from natural causes. The 
photos, exhibits A, B and 1, show the west part of the 
driveway to be entirely intact, except for the crack 
running east and west shown on exhibit B, and there ap-
pears to be no difference in elevation between the two 
sides of this crack. The whole driveway must have 
settled, and such settlement is as readily attributable to 
the weather conditions or to the manner of the original 
construction as it is to the use by defendants' trucks. 
Again, how can either defendant be held liable with-
out proof that it was its trucks that caused the sinking1 
Suppose it was the trucks of just one of the defendants 
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that caused the sinking. Could the other defendant then 
be held liable~ Are we to assume that the trucks of 
both defendants caused the sinking~ If there was a 
sinking it could have been caused by the weight of one 
extra heavy truck going over the driveway once. That 
truck could have belonged to or have been servicing 
either of the defendants, or it could have belonged to 
or have been servicing neither of them. It is apparent 
that to charge both, or either of the defendants with 
having caused the sinking through use by their or its 
trucks is to indulge, not in any legitimate inference, but 
in pure spe,culation. If the driveway sank after its con-
struction, why didn't it sink on the east side as well as 
on the west side~ The testimony above quoted, and 
exhibit 1, show that it is on a level with the sidewalk to 
the east everi though that sidewalk was ''shattered really 
worse than the driveway and has been shattered for 20 
years." (R. p. 212). What caused the shattering of the 
sidewalk to the east¥ That cannot be credited to the 
use of the driveway by trucks. It is entirely possible 
that the cracks in the driveway also occurred from causes 
other than passage of trucks over the driveway. -
Fortunately we are not left to speculation, nor is 
there any basis even for indulging in inferences, as to 
how this difference in elevation between the west edge 
of the driveway and the adjacent sidewalk occurred. 
It was built tha,t way when the sidewalk to the west was 
rebuilt in 1930 or 1931. This is the definite, positive 
testimony of plaintiff's own witness, James M. Arm-
strong, from his own personal knowledge of the fact. 
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He testified that the sidewalk to the west of the driveway 
was reconstructed in 1930 or 1931 (R. p. 220). He fur-
ther testified as follows: 
Q. Xow do you recall and did you observe that 
when the sidewalk was built west from the 
driveway that it was built a little higher 
than the driveway1 
A. Yes, I recall that very markedly. There isn't 
a great deal of raise there but there is a 
raise and it has always been there.'' 
Q. Since the sidewalk was built on the west side 
of the driveway 1 
A. Yes. 
In view of such testimony where is there any room 
for infering that the use of the driveway by trucks 
caused the difference in elevation between the driveway 
and the sidewalk to the west 1 The cause of the difference 
in elevation is thus fully and definitely accounted for. 
The walk was constructed that way, and these defen-
dants had nothing whatsoever to do with that con-
struction. 
IV. 
AN ABUTTING OWNER OR OCCUPIER IS NOT RE-
SPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING THE SIDEWALK IN 
FRONT OF HIS PREMISES. 
Section 15-7-47, U.C.A. 1943, provides as follows: 
''The foregoing provisions of this Article 
[relating to special assessment for street con-
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struction] shall apply to the repaving of streets 
and sidewalks, but not to repairs thereon. The 
governing body shall, by ordinance, define what 
constitutes repaving, what repairs and what ex-
traordinary repairs. The cost of ordinary repairs 
shall be born by the municipality, and the gov-
erning body may levy and collect special taxes 
upon the abutting property for the purpose of 
defraying the cost of repairs defined to be extra-
ordinary without previous notice of intention, or 
any right of the property owners to protest.'' 
Under the foregoing statute, and under the author-
ities generally, the abutting property owner or occupier 
has no obligation or duty to keep the sidewalk in front 
of his :property in repair. This is true even though the 
property owner constructed the sidewalk, and it was 
taken over by the city after construction. See Wright 
v. Hines, 235 SW 831; Carney v. P11octor, 237 Mass. 203, 
129 NE 605; Birchfield v. Diehl, 189 !SW 845. 
v. 
THERE IS NO LIABILITY ON THE PART OF AN 
ABUTTING OWNER OR OCCUPIER UNLESS HE DOES 
SOMETHING AFFIRMATIVE TO CREATE THE DEFECT. 
Atkinson v. Sheriff Motor Co., 203 Iowa 195, 212 
NW 484. 
The defendant maintained a sales office and service 
station. A driveway crossed the sidewalk to a side en-
trance and was used by automobiles and trucks. Such 
use caused a depression in the sidewalk 6 to 12 inches 
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wide, 2 feet long and llf2 inches deep. Plaintiff stepped 
one foot in this depression and fell and was injured. The 
verdict was directed for defendant. The court held the 
duty to repair rests with the city, saying: 
• 'It is a general rule, almost universally re-
cognized, that an owner or tenant in the occu-
pancy of a building abutting upon a public side-
walk or street, who, by some affirmative act or 
perhaps by some act of negligence constituting a 
nuisance, is liable to persons injured in com~e­
quence thereof. (citing cases.) 
"It is either conceded or clearly shown by the 
evidence that the depression in the sidewalk of 
which plaintiff complained was several years in 
forming, and that it resulted from the passage 
of automobiles and trucks from and to the street 
over the same. It did not result from the affirma-
tive act of the servants or agents of defendant, 
nor was it the result of negligence on its part. 
"Appellee (defendant) did nothing affirma-
tively to cause the depression in the walk, which 
was attributable soley to the use made thereof, 
which was lawful." 
Adams v. Crapotte, 69 SW 2nd 460. Tex. 
Defendant leased a garage facing St. Mary's Street. 
There was an abrasion in the sidewalk at the place where 
customers and others drove into and out of defendant's 
place of business. The evidence showed that the use of 
the driveway by cars going in and out made the hole 
deeper after defendant's occupancy. Plaintiff fell by 
stepping into the hole. The jury found defendant negli-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
gent in causing this condition to exist, in permitting it 
to exist and in failing to repair the hole. The plaintiff 
theory was that defendant was enjoying some kind of 
special privilege in the sidewalk by using the same as 
an integral part of his business, for which reason the 
duty devolved upon him, as the proprietor of the busi-
ness, to keep the sidewalk in repair. 
"It would scarcely seem necessary to cite 
authorities in support of the proposition that 
sidewalks are a part of the street, that the duty 
to exercise ordinary care to maintain them in a 
reasonably safe condition for the use of the public 
rests upon the city, and that the abutting owner 
owes no duty in that regard. 
''Plaintiff seeks to hold the tenant liable 
on the ground that he contributed to this condi-
tion by inviting his customers to use the drive in 
way over the sidewalk Her theory is based 
essentially upon the assumption that appellant 
was making a wrongful use of a portion of the 
public thoroughfare. Is the assumption correct 1 
We think not. Access to a public highway is an 
incident to the ownership of land abutting theron, 
and the right of such access is private property 
passing to the lessee. That right cannot be taken 
for public purposes or destroyed without ade-
quate compensation being made therefor. 26 SW 
250; 36 L.R.A. (NS) 662; Ann. Cas. 1913 E 870; 
153 NE 325; 47 A.L.R. 897; 13 RCL p. 142, Sec. 
126; 44 C.J. Sec. 3711, p. 943." The court quotes 
from Shudder v. Schroth, 146 Cal. 437, 80 p. 624, 
as follows: 
'' 'The use of a sidewalk by the owner of a 
lot for purposes of communication with the street 
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is equally legitimate, and equally an ordinary use, 
as that of passing longitudinally along it.' " 
·'In its last analysis the judgment in the 
instant case can be upheld alone upon the ground 
that it is the duty of abutting owners, and like-
\\ise of their lessees, to repair the public tho-
roughfare adjoining their premises. That duty 
does not exist, but rests exclusively on the muni-
cipality, and where there is not duty there can be 
no negligence.'' 
Home Brewing Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 123 NE 
721. (Ind.) 
This city was sued for damages by a Mrs. Crawford 
who fell because of a hole in the sidewalk. The hole was 
in front of the Brewing Co's premises and was about six 
inches west of an elevator in the sidewalk used to take 
beer into and out of the company's basement. In de-
livering kegs the company would allow them to roll down 
from the wagon onto a mat and then roll over to the 
elevator. The effect of the deliveries and uses of the side-
walk was to create the hole which was 2 feet long, 1:% 
feet wide and 3 inches deep. The city paid the judgment 
and sued the company to recover the amount it was 
forced to pay. The court denied judgment saying: 
''In order that the city may recover it must 
appear that the unsafe condition of the sidewalk 
has been brought about by the wrongful act or 
omission of such alleged injuring party; and such 
alleged injuring party will not be estopped from 
showing that he was under no obligation to keep 
the street in a safe condition, and that it was not 
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through his fault that the accident occurred. 
There is no charge in the complaint that the appel-
lant had made any wrongful use of the sidewalk. 
It was engaged in a business that at the time was 
lawful, and it had a right under the law to de-
liver to its customers its merchandise over and 
upon the sidewalks of the city. There is no violent 
or improper act charged. The use of the side-
walk for the purpose of delivering its merchan-
dise was in common with a similar use of the side-
walk made by a number of other persons. The 
defect was not a result of any affirmative wrong-
ful act on the part of appellant, but was the 
result of the continuous use thereof for 4 years, or 
more, by appellant and others, including the gen-
eral :public walking over such sidewalk, which con-
tinuous use for 4 years resulted in the defect com-
plained of. All of these uses made of the sidewalk 
were proper and legitimate and such uses pro-
duced the gradual wear which resulted in the 
defect complained of. 
''The duty of repairing streets and sidewalks 
is upon the city, and not upon the abutting own-
ers, or upon the persons using such streets or 
sidewalks in a legitmate way and such abutting 
property owners and such persons so using the 
street are not liable to a person injured by such 
uses, unless such uses were wrongful and un-
lawful.'' 
Volke v. Otway, 181 A. 156. 
Plaintiff sued the owner and tenant of premises 
abutting a sidewalk for injuries received when she caught 
her foot in a depression in the sidewalk near an iron 
door covering the stairway to the celler of the building. 
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The plaintiff's theory was that trucks backed up onto 
the sidewalk, merchandise in heavy parcels were thrown 
upon the sidewalk next to this iron door and such use 
caused the depression. There was no testimony as to how 
long the depression had existed, though it was observed 
as early as 1918 by one witness. The tenant entered upon 
the premises in 1934. There was no proof as to what cre-
ated the depression. The court affirmed a judgment 
of nonsuit, saying: 
''The trial court when passing on the motion 
to nonsuit was bound to accept as an undisputed 
fact, with no proof as to its cause, that the de-
pression in the sidewalk which caused the plain-
tiff's injuries, existed in 1918. The mere happen-
ing of an accident, and the fact that a sidewalk 
has been in a defective and dilapidated condition 
for several years, to an extent that it constitutes 
a nuisance, does not in itself render an abutting 
owner liable to the injured party. The burden is 
on the plaintiff to show that the owner or his 
predecessor in title participated in the creation 
of the nuisance. It is entirely settled in this state 
that the owner owes no duty to maintain the side-
walk in front of his premises, and is not respon-
sible for any defects therein which are not caused 
by his own wrongful act.'' 
There was nothing unlawful, or even extraordinary, 
in the use of the driveway across the sidewalk under the 
evidence in this case. The Z.C.M.I. used it to receive 
merchandise for its tea room and to take out the garbage 
resulting therefrom. The Standard Furniture Co. used 
it to take furniture in and out. The law is well settled 
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that an abutting owner or occupant has a right of access 
from the street to his property. The rule is stated in 
25 Am. Jur. p. 448, Sec. 154, Highways, as follows: 
"The right of access to and from a public 
highway is one of the incidents of the ownership 
or occupancy of land abutting thereon. Such right 
is appurtenant to the land and exists when the 
fee title to the way is in the public as well as 
when it is in private ownership. It is a property 
right of which the owner cannot be deprived 
without just compensation.'' 
To the same effect is 44 C.J. p. 943, Sec. 3711, apply-
ing the rule specifically to city streets, citing Davis v. 
Midvale City, 56 Utah, 1, 189 P. 74, and Hague v. Juab 
County M~lls, et1c., Co., 37 Utah 290, 107 P. 249. 
Den Br,aven v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 
115 N. J. L. 543, 181 A. 46. Here the court, sustaining! 
a demurrer to plaintiff's complaint said: 
''It is not alleged that the use of the side-
walk was in improper one, in that vehicles were 
not proper to be so used or that the crossing 
itself was not a lawful one and suitable for the 
purpose. The use, therefore, by the company was 
that use which every occupant of premises with 
a driveway therefrom crossing the sidewalk into 
the public highway exercises, each differing in 
degree, perhaps. It was the same lawful use, 
though different in kind, that the pedestrian exer-
cises when he travels the sidewalk longitudinally 
or in crossing. 
"In the present day of the prevalence of the 
automobile it is perhaps the exceptional dwelling 
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or business place that does not have for the use 
of its owner or occupant a crossing from the 
vehicle portion of the highway into its premises 
crossing the sidewalk, usually over paving built 
specially for the purpose. Such construction and 
use, however, are recognized as normal and law-
ful ones. If the law were as contended for by 
the appellant, it would follow that an owner of 
property could not so construct or use the side-
walk, usually the only means of access, without 
incurring an obligation to correct the slippery 
condition to which his vehicles had contributed, 
and incurring liability to any one who happened 
to slip thereon." 
VI. 
THE AUTHORITIES CITED BY PLAINTIFF ARE NOT 
IN POINT UNDER THE FACTS OF THE INSTANT CASE. 
Bearing in mind that in the case at ~bar there is in 
the record no evidence at all that these defendants, or 
either of them, constructed or maintained the driveway in 
question, and there is not only no evidence that the 
use made of the driveway by either defendant caused 
it to sink, or that there has ever been any sinking, but 
the evidence affirmatively shows that the sidewalk to 
the west was rebuilt in 1930 or 1931 and was then rebuilt 
higher than the driveway, we shall show that plaintiff's 
authorities have no application to this case. 
Salt Lake City v. Schubach, 108 Utah 266, 159 P. 
2nd 149. In this case the abutting owner and occupant 
were using for their own business purposes a well in 
the sidewalk with iron doors to receive goods into the 
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basement. This was an extraordinary use of the side-
walk and involved a structure placed in the sidewalk 
hy the owner, which strueture was not kept in proper 
repair. There was no right in the first place to install 
and maintain the structure. But, as already shown, an 
abutting owner or occupant has the legal right to drive 
into and out of his property over the sidewalk. 
Gra.nucd v. CZaasern, 204 Cal. 509, 269 P. 437, 59 
ALR 435. This case likewise involved the placing of a 
structure over the sidewalk that was for the sole benefit 
of the abutting owner or occupant, a wooden structure 
superimposed upon the sidewalk used for a driveway. 
This case is referred to and distinguished upon its 
special facts in the case of DaT!y v. Mathew·s. (Cal. App.) 
122 P. 2nd 81, where the court says : 
"Under the common law there is no liability 
upon the part of an adjacent landowner for in-
juries occurring on a public sidewalk. Likewise in 
this state there is no obligation of the abutting 
landowner to keep the sidewalk in front of his 
premises in repair or in a safe condition for 
public travel, in the absence of statute or ordi-
nance imposing such a duty upon him. Where a 
portion of a sidewalk is used for the particular 
benefit of the adjacent landowner, such as grates, 
or glass therein for light, or sidewalk elevators 
or heavy planked driveways, it has been held that 
the abutting landowner is liable for negligent 
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construction or maintenance which proximately · 
causes personal injury to a pedestrian. No case, 
howeyer, has gone so far as to charge an abutting 
landowner with liability for the condition of a 
driveway, whether used by him or not, unless he 
personally created, th.rough use or otherwise, 
some unsafe condition therein. 
''The case of Granucci v. Claasen, 204 Cal. 
509, 269 P. 437, 59 ALR 435 .... is not contra to 
what we have said. In that case the abutting 
property owner had constructed, with the permis-
sion of the city, a special type of driveway for 
her exclusive benefit; and so it was held that she 
was directly liable to a pedestrian for an injury 
caused by her failure to keep the driveway in 
repair. The case is an exception to the rule and 
its doctrine does not cover the case before us nor 
should it be extended to it." 
The case of M onsch v. Pellister, 187 Cal. 790, 204 P. 
224, involved a skylight structure in the sidewalk and so 
has no application to the present case. 
The cases of Davis v. T,allon, 96 N JL 618, 103 A. 236, 
and Zak v. Craig, 5 NJ Misc. 275, 136 A. 410, are referred 
to and explained in Volke v. Otway (NJL), 181 A. 156, 
hereinbefore cited and quoted as follows: 
''Both decisions held that there was sufficient 
proof from which the jury might infer that the 
landlord leased the land and sidewalk for a use 
not consistent with the purpose for which it was 
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constructed, which is not the fact in the case now 
under consideration.'' 
It appears in both cases that a regularly constructed 
driveway was not involved, but the use was over the 
sidewalk as such and that the unauthorized use over it 
by heavy vehicles broke the sidewalk and made it dan-
gerous to pedestrians. In the Davis case the court says: 
''The jury might infer from the evidence 
that the appellants leased the land and sidewalk 
for a use not consistent with the purpose for 
which the walk was constructed ... and that 
such use might, and probably would, create a 
nuisance by obstructing the safe use thereof by 
pedestrians.'' 
In the Zak case the court says : 
''There was plenary proof that the sidewalk 
did not become defective and unsafe from the 
ordinary use thereof by the general public, but 
it became broken up as a result of a use for 
which it was not normally designed, namely, the 
passage of heavy motor trucks over it to and from 
plaintiff's garage, and in which the flagstones 
were broken and a hole 7 inches in diameter and 
6 inches in depth was made in the sidewalk.'' 
Without further comment, we submit it is patent 
that these cases can be of no assistance in deciding the 
instant case. 
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JiuUin.s v. Siegal Cooper Co., 95 App. Div. 234, 88 
NYS 737 aff. 183 NY 129, 75 NE 1112, likewise is not 
in point. There was no constructed driveway there in-
volved. The sidewalk was constructed of flagstones. 
The stable was built out to or very near the sidewalk 
line. On one side of this building there was a lane lead-
ing to the rear to another stable. ''During the summer 
of 1902, some months before the accident to plaintiff, the 
flagstone in front of the lane became disturbed out of 
position by reason of heavily laden wagons and trucks 
passing back and forth over the same on entering and 
leaving said premises.'' A flagstone became loose so it 
rocked when stepped on and was raised above the adjoin-
ing stone 2% to 3 inches. Here was definite proof that 
the defendant, or his contractor, in going over the side-
walk with vehicles laden with rock or manure caused the 
defect complained of. It is evident therefor, that the 
decision in that case can have no authority in the case 
at bar. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit the plaintiff produced no 
evidence of any negligent act or omission on the part 
of either of these defendants. There is no proof that 
either defendant caused the difference in elevation be-
tween the driveway and the sidewalk to the west, over 
which elevation plaintiff stumbled and fell. The evi-
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dence shows that this difference in elevation resulted 
from a reconstruction of the sidewalk to the west. There 
is no showing that either of these defendants had any 
duty to correct that construction. We respectfully sub-
mit that the trial court committed no error in entering 
a non suit and dismissal and that its action in so doing 
should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted. 
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN & 
CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Standard Furniture 
Compamy, 
HOMER HOLMGREN 
ROBERT A. SPOONER 
Attorneys for Defendant Zion's Co-operative 
M eroantile Institution. 
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